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EXTENDING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: DO
INTERNET E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS WARRANT A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?
"Foran attorney entrusted with ethical responsibilities
to preserve client confidences, what use is the speed and
flexibility of e-mail if there is no reasonable
assuranceof confidentiality?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
The communications boom of the late twentieth century produced the Internet and electronic mail ("e-mail"), enabling people to
efficiently communicate on a worldwide scale.2 Questions about a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet e-mail communications' remain unanswered. 4 Courts have held e-mail commu-

' Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptography Primer, in THE

INTERNET AND

BUSINESS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 15 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr.

ed., 1996).

See Betty Ann Olmsted, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 523, 524 (1996) (indicating email easiest and most effective way to communicate worldwide almost
instantaneously). "The communication of e-mail messages through the Internet
may become the standard form of communication in the future." Donald S.
Skupsky, Discovery and Destruction of E-mail, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS:
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 59 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed.,
1996). According to a 1997 American Bar Association Law Firm Technology
Survey, "91 percent of firms with more than 20 lawyers and 44 percent of firms
2

with 20 or fewer lawyers are already using the Internet to communicate with
clients." Stuart J. Chanen, 'Return to Sender' Won't Cut It, ABA J. 84 (March

1998).
' Internet e-mail communication travels through the sender's and recipient's
servers and through intermediate providers. See Skupsky, supra note 2, at 49
(discussing Internet e-mail messages being recorded on recipients, senders, and
intermediate systems). Private networks and direct computer communications do
not require intermediate providers. See id. (explaining private e-mail services

enable sender's and receiver's to utilize single network without intermediary
computers).
See Mary F. Lapidus, Using Modern Technology to Communicate with
Clients: Proceed with Caution and Common Sense, Hous. LAW., Oct. 1996, at 39
4
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nications sent through private and closed computer networks warrant
a reasonable expectation of privacy and are subject to the attorneyclient privilege.5 In contrast, courts have not yet determined if Internet e-mail communications are subject to the attorney-client privilege.6 This note, therefore, will focus on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to e-mail communications over the Internet.

(observing lawyer's use of e-mail raises privilege issues not resolved by courts
and bar associations).
The attorney-client privilege only applies to
communications that afford a reasonable expectation of privacy. See generally
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (stating landline telephone
communications afford reasonable expectation of privacy within Fourth
Amendment); Askin v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding radio
portion of cordless phone communication not afforded privacy expectation under
the Fourth Amendment); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W.
Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995) (holding facsimile communications are
privileged).
A reasonable expectation of privacy is derived from Fourth
Amendment protections prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures. See Katz,
389 U.S. at 351 (noting Fourth Amendment protects people's privacy, not
places).
' See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., No. 932528-G, 1994 WL 878920, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994) (holding email communications over private network between corporate in-house counsel
and employees of same corporation subject to attorney-client privilege to extent
communication sought legal advice or anticipated litigation); see also United
States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (U.S.A.F. 1996) (finding private, internal network
e-mail communication possess reasonable expectation of privacy). In Maxwell
the court, in determining the validity of a search warrant, distinguished the
America Online e-mail system at issue from Internet e-mail communications.
See id. at 417 (observing Internet has less secure e-mail system than American
Online's private e-mail network).
6 See Arthur L. Smith, E-Mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege
(visited
July 12, 1998) <http://www.computerbar.org/netethics/asmith.htm>. (stating few
court decisions have held e-mail communications are protected by attorney-client
privilege but no case focused on Internet e-mail); Harry M. Gruber, Note, EMail: The Attorney-Client Privilege Applied, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 624, 625
(1998) (observing no court has held attorney-client privilege does not apply to email communications); Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal

1999]

A TTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Part I of this note traces the history and policy of the attorneyclient privilege, briefly discussing varied interpretations of the
privilege at both federal and state court levels.7 Part II examines
communication mediums such as landline telephones, cordless telephones, cellular telephones, direct computer to computer networks
and private computer networks, noting the availability of the attorney-client privilege to some of these mediums.8 Part III discusses email over the Internet, specifically analyzing the inherent security
risks that endanger a reasonable expectation of privacy. 9 Part IV focuses on the application of the attorney-client privilege to Internet email communications, finding relevant analogies between Internet email and other modes of communication presently protected under
the privilege.' ° This note concludes that courts and legislatures will
determine that the attorney-client privilege is flexible enough to encompass Internet e-mail communications."
II. HISTORY AND POLICY OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Federal and state rules of civil procedure make any matter that is
relevant and unprivileged discoverable. 2 The attorney-client privi-

Practice:Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REV.

851, 853 (1998) (offering Internet e-mail represents wild card untested in law
presenting unknowable consequences).
See infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text (discussing attorney-client
privilege history and policy).
' See infra notes 34-82 and accompanying text (tracing application of
attorney-client privilege to various communication mediums).
9 See infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text (analyzing security risk
involved in Internet e-mail).
'oSee infra notes 109-143 and accompanying text (analogizing application
of attorney-client privilege as applied to various communication modes to
Internet e-mail).
" See infra note 144 and accompanying text (concluding Internet e-mail
protected under attorney-client privilege in future).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
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lege limits discoverable matters by protecting the client from the
mandatory disclosure of otherwise discoverable communications. 3
The privilege only applies to communications between the attorney
and client that are intended to be confidential. 4 The attorney-client
privilege is an exception to the general rule that a witness has a duty
to testify. 5 Neither the client nor the attorney on behalf of the client
must testify to the contents of a privileged communication. 6 A client holds the privilege, and may refuse to disclose, and prevent any
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The
information sought need not be admissible if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
Id. MAss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.
It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id.
" See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (holding attorney-client
privilege places seal of secrecy upon communications). "[The attorney-client
privilege permanently protect[s] communications made in confidence when legal
advice is sought from an attorney in the attorney's capacity as legal advisor."
Cynthia B. Feagan, Comment, Issues of Waiver in Multiple-Party Litigation: The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REv.
757, 758 (1993).
14 See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 17 (1961)
(opining privilege only
applies to communications from lawyer to client giving legal advice or client to
attorney if confidentiality intended).
" See William P. Matthews, Comment, Encoded Confidences: Electronic
Mail, the Internet, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 273,
281 (1996) (quoting Wigmore's opinion of attorney-client privilege).
16 Federal and state rules of evidence pertaining to discovery provide
for
privileged communications between an attorney and client. See generally FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); MAss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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other person from disclosing, confidential communications made
between the client and the lawyer.' 7 The privilege must be expressly
raised and asserted in a timely fashion in connection with a specific
confidential communication.18 The attorney-client privilege serves
as a testimonial and discovery shield for communications not otherwise privileged.' 9
The attorney-client privilege may generally be claimed if the
following elements are present: "(1) where legal advice of any kind
is sought, (2) from a legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communication relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected, (7) from
the disclosure by himself or his lawyer, (8) except the privilege be
waived." 20 The party seeking to assert the attorney-client privilege

,7 See Feagan, supra note 13, at 758 (discussing client's rights to prohibit
others from disclosing confidential communications); see also Jose L. Nunez,
Note and Comment, Regulating the Airwaves: The Governmental Alternative to
Avoid Cellular Uncertainty on Privacy and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 ST.

L. REv. 479, 491 (1994) (analogizing common law privileges in Rule
503 in Federal Rules of Evidence to attorney-client privilege). See generally
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (indicating privilege limited to
communications within the scope of the professional relationship).
THOMAS

's See Feagan, supra note 13, at 759.
'9 FED. R. EvID. 501 provides:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision there shall be governed
by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
Id. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20 provides in pertinent part: "Any person of
sufficient understanding, although a party, may testify in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, in court or before a person who has authority to receive evidence...."
Id.

8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961). In United States v. Wilson, the First Circuit held the following four
elements must be shown by the person seeking to claim the privilege:
20
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has the burden to show the communication should be afforded the
privilege." The privilege may be waived if confidential communications are purposefully or inadvertently disclosed to a third party, or
will knowingly be disclosed to a third party in the future." The
privilege only extends to communications intended to remain confidential that are made under circumstances where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.23 A communication made in circumthe person sought to a client of the counsel; (2) that counsel was acting
as a lawyer in connection with the matter at issue; (3) the matter to
which the privilege is asserted relates to the facts communicated for
the purpose of securing legal opinion, legal services or assists in a legal proceeding; (4) the privilege has not been waived.
798 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1986).
21 See Wilson, 798 F.2d at 512-13 (holding
defendant required to make
affirmative showing of all four elements); see also In re Reorganization of Elec.
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 425 Mass. 419, 421, 681 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1997) (indicating
burden extends beyond simply proving relationship but to all other required
elements); United States v. Mobile Corp., 149 F.R.D. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
22 See United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714,
723 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding
defendants attorney-client privilege claim fails because third party present). In
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., the court stated:
Many courts consider the following factors to determine if an inadvertent disclosure loses its privilege: the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of document production, the number of inadvertent disclosures, the extent of
the disclosure, any delay and measure taken to rectify the disclosure,
whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not be
served by relieving the party of error.
885 F. Supp. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa. 1994). For instance, documents shown to a
third party renders the attorney-client privilege inapplicable. See Drew v. Drew,
250 Mass. 41, 44-45, 144 N.E. 763, 764 (1924) (finding attorney-client privilege
inapplicable when document shown to third party).
" See United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329 (11 th Cir. 1983) (stating
privilege exists if communication intended to remain confidential and made
under circumstances were confidentiality reasonably expected and understood).
Communications made in the presence of third parties may not be reasonably
expected or intended to remain confidential. Id.; see also Reorganization, 425
Mass. at 422, 681 N.E. at 841 (explaining modem trend that privilege not lost
when both attorney and client take reasonable precautions to ensure
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stances where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, however,
may be subject to waiver of the privilege despite intentions to maintain confidentiality if the communication is not kept confidential.24
Of the now existing common law communication privileges, the
attorney-client privilege is the oldest.25 The Supreme Court of the
United States first recognized the privilege in 1888.26 Every state
recognizes some form of the attorney-client privilege either by way
of statute, common law, or rules of evidence.27 Most states have incorporated the attorney-client privilege into their evidence code and

confidentiality); cf. id. at 422, 681 N.E. at 841 (citing Wigmore recognized
privilege survives when attorney acts in bad faith toward client and discloses
communications).
24

See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND THE

WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 119 (1996) (stating communication made with
intention of confidentiality waived if not kept confidential).
25 See Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(providing useful discussion of attorney-client privilege history); see also STEVEN
A. SALTZBURG ET. AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 652 (2d ed. 1983)

(indicating attorney-client privilege existed in hands of attorney in 18th century).
No adequate historical account of the attorney-client privilege exists. See
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5472 (1986).
The privilege unquestionably existed during the reign of
Elizabeth I. See id at § 5472. (quoting Wigmore's version of privilege). The
privilege originated in second-century Rome. See Marshall Williams, The Scope
of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in View of Reason and Experience, 25
How. L. J. 425, 426 (1982) (explaining privilege prohibited slaves from
disclosing information given to them by their master's family).
26 See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (commenting
attorneyclient privilege rule of necessity in interest and administration of justice).
27 See Ford Motor Company v. Leggat, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 920, 924, 904
S.W.2d. 643, 647 (1995) (opining one state may offer broader attorney-client
privilege than another state). Most jurisdictions have codified the common law
privilege by statute, offering the same protection common law offered. See
Matthews, supra note 15, at 280 (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2290, at 555-56 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
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at least twenty state legislatures have codified the privilege.28 Under
federal law, the attorney-client privilege exists by way of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.29
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage and facilitate the
unrestricted flow of information between attorney and client, promoting "broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice."30 Scholars justify the modern attorneyclient privilege with a utilitarian analysis, believing a lawyer most
effectively serves a client if the client can fully disclose information
to the attorney without the fear of discovery.3 Opponents of the attorney-client privilege argue that it may impede investigation of
truth and must narrowly be interpreted.32 Courts, consequently,
28 See

Simon J. Frankel, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 45, 54-55 n.52 (1992)

(explaining scope of privilege defined by common law interpretations of statutes
and rules of evidence).
29 See FED. R. EvID. 501 (providing for privilege of person or witness).
30 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. Individuals may seek legal representation with
the knowledge that they can discuss matters openly with an attorney because the
privilege often protects such communications from compelled disclosure. See
id. at 383 (explaining sound legal advice depends upon lawyer being fully
informed by client). The privilege is based on the need for the lawyer to know
everything relating to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the
lawyer's professional duties are to be successfully carried out. See Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
31 See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at § 5472 (suggesting social good derived
from proper performance of function of lawyers acting for clients outweighs
harm from suppression of evidence). Traditionally, the lawyer held the privilege
based upon the reasoning lawyers should not violate "his obligation as a
gentleman to keep secret a matter told him in confidence." Id.
" See United States v. Nixon, 481 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (cautioning
privilege impedes grand jury's truth-seeking function and therefore not
expansively construed); see also Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications,98 HARV. L. REv. 1454, 1454 (1985) (acknowledging attorneyclient privilege hinders legal system's truth seeking objective, instead favoring
other societal interests). The privilege arguably only suppresses evidence of what
a client said to the attorney, therefore only impeding the use of impeachment
testimony. See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at § 5472 (stating proponents of privilege
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weigh the need for full disclosure against the need for full and frank
communication between an attorney and client.33
III. MODERN COMMUNICATIONS AND PRIVILEGE
A.

Landline Telephones

In Katz v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court of the United

States held the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects landline telephone conversations from unreasonable search
and seizure." Landline telephone conversations are subject to constitutional protections resulting from an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when using this medium. 3 6 Consequently, the

attorney-client privilege is applicable to landline telephone conver-

believe costs are minimal). But see id. at § 5472 (asserting opponent's believe
privilege conceals reality consequently cloaking much client and lawyer
wrongdoing).
" See Feagan, supra note 13, at 760 (opining courts balance need for full
disclosure and desirability of encouraging communication).
14 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
3"See id. at 353 (holding Government's activities in electronically listening
to landline telephone conversation violated reasonably relied upon privacy
expectations and constituted search and seizure). U.S. CONST. amend. IV
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in the persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by an Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. In Katz, the court found that the act of wiretapping a landline telephone
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
(announcing people's privacy protected by Fourth Amendment where privacy
sought). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (maintaining landline telephone
conversations not protected by Fourth Amendment).
36 See Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Competence and Confidentiality

in the Context of Cellular Telephone, Cordless Telephone and E-Mail
Communications, 33 WILLAME'VrE L. REv. 467, 471-72 (1997) (discussing United
States Supreme Court's holding in Katz v. United States).

196

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

sations because a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with regard to this form of communication.37 The reasonable expectation of
privacy need not be an absolute guarantee for the attorney-client
privilege to extend to a landline communication.3"
Aside from constitutional and common law protections for
landline telephone calls, there are federal and state statutory prohibitions against interception and unauthorized use of such calls.39 Under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 40 a client
does not waive the attorney-client privilege if a landline communication is intercepted. 4 ' Landline telephone calls intercepted in violation of federal law may not be used as evidence in any American
proceeding. 2 Similarly, the Massachusetts Eavesdropping Act43 pro-

" See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1973)
(finding establishment of prima facie evidence of improper electronic
surveillance of telephone calls is required to preserve privileged matter); see also
Jarvis, supra note 36, at 471 (declaring no one would doubt attorney-client
privilege applies to landline telephone conversations).
38 See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 472 (stating landline calls not usually
intercepted but such occurrences do not destroy individual's expectation of
privacy).
'9 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 272,
§ 99 (1990).
40 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994) provides in pertinent
part: "No otherwise
privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance
with, or in violation of, the provision of this chapter shall lose its privileged
character." Id.
41

id.

See Jarvis, supra note 36 at 473 (observing 18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides
wire communications intercepted in violation of federal law is inadmissible
evidence). 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994) provides in pertinent part:
41

Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
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hibits the use of wire or oral communications in a criminal trial if
obtained in violation of state law.44 Intercepted wire communications, including landline telephone calls, will not lose any privilege
under Massachusetts law. 45 At federal and state levels, landline
communications are afforded strong legal prohibitions and constitu6
tional protections, justifying a reasonable expectation of privacy.4
B. Cordless and CellularCommunications
A reasonable expectation of privacy in a communication medium may be considered a condition precedent to the attachment of
the attorney-client privilege.47 Several jurisdictions have found that
cordless and cellular communications do not offer a reasonable expectation of privacy)6 In addition, ethic's opinions have asserted
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Id.
43 MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 272, § 99(P) provides: "Any person who is a
defendant in a criminal trial in a court of the commonwealth may move to
suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence
derived therefrom.. .that the communication was unlawfully intercepted." Id.
44 Id.
45 See Commonwealth v. Alves, 414 Mass. 1006, 1006, 608 N.E.2d
733, 733
(1993) (stating MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99 (1990) provides no privileged
intercepted wire communication loses its privileged character).
46 See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 473 (suggesting reasonable expectation of
confidentiality and privacy for landline calls results from statutory prohibitions);
David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 60
TEx. B.J. 104, 107 (1997) (explaining interception and misdirection of landline
communications occur but legal protections are offered).
41 See Nunez, supra note 17, at 490-91 (contending confidentiality
coterminus with privacy and without privacy there is no privilege).
41 See Askin v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 103-04 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
radio
wave portion of cordless phone communication not afforded privacy expectation
under Fourth Amendment); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding cordless telephones are broadcast over radio waves for all to hear
affording no Fourth Amendment protection); People v. Chavez, 44 Cal. App. 4th
1144, 1153, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347, 353 (Ca. App. Ct. 1996) (holding radio portion
of cordless telephone call did not encompass expectation of privacy); see
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that the attorney-client privilege does not protect cordless or cellular
communications. 49 These judicial decisions and ethic's opinions,
many of which pre-date the 1994 amendments to the federal statutes,
reflect a general belief that cordless and cellular technologies do not
provide the requisite reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to
extend the attorney-client privilege. °
Cordless telephone communications are a hybrid between FM
radio frequencies with radio range and the traditional landline telephone.' While the landline portion of a cordless telephone call is
deemed to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy, the radio
segment of the call has no such expectation attached.52 "Cordless

generally Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989); State v. Smith, 149 Wis.
2d 89, 438 N.W. 2d 571 (1989). At least one court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cellular telephone conversations. See Lapidus, supra
note 4, at 39 (citing Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986));
but cf. Jarvis, supra note 36, at 476 (stating no case appears to hold Fourth
Amendment protection unavailable for cellular telephone conversations).
49 Jarvis, supra note 36, at 475. Cellular communications
should not be used
by a lawyer discussing confidential material if there is a real risk the conversation
will be intercepted by a third party. See Mark A. Cohen, Privilege for E-Mail
and Cell-Phone Content Sought, MASS. LAW. WKLY, June 16, 1997, at 1 (quoting
Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics Committee Opinion No. 1994-5 (1994));
see generally New York City Bar Ass'n Op. No. 1994-11 (1994); Iowa Ethics
Op. No. 90-44 (1991).
50 18 U.S.C. § 2510, 1994 Amendment struck out "provision
which excluded
radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between
handset and base unit from the definition of electronic communication." Id.
" See Lapidus, supra note 4, at 39 (explaining FM radio frequency portion
of cordless telephones similar to operating radio station and broadcasting your
message). Once the cordless telephone communication is being carried through
the landline, statute and expectations inherent in landline communications control
the call. See Hricik, supra note 46, at 108 (opining landline segment of cordless
phone call has reasonable expectation of privacy).
52 See generally supra note 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing radio
portion of cordless telephone call).
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phone calls are only rarely intercepted or interrupted." 53 Some
courts, acknowledging the steady growth of technology, have protected the radio portion of cordless communications under state law
and the Fourth Amendment. The majority of courts, however, hold
the radio portion of cordless telephone communications do not offer
a reasonable expectation of privacy.5
Cellular telephone communications, similar to cordless communications, were considered "ordinary radio waves wandering along6
public airwaves, not subject to legal protection from interception.5
In fact, cellular communications are broadcast within a range of frequency not susceptible to inadvertent interception (unlike cordless
communications) absent specially adapted scanners."
Cellular

5' Jarvis, supra note 36, at 476. Regardless of the frequency that cordless
telephone calls are intercepted or interrupted, two things are true: "cordless
telephone calls may be intercepted by someone nearby using a police scanner,
radio, baby monitor, or another cordless phone, and pre-1994, cordless calls were
not afforded the statutory protection landline and cellular communications were
under federal law." Id. But see Hricik, supra note 46, at 108 (stating inadvertent
disclosures occurred frequently with cordless phones).
14 See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177-78 (5th
Cir. 1992) (finding
advancing technology in cordless telephone communications adequately creates
reasonable expectation of privacy under Fourth Amendment). The Smith court
held that Fourth Amendment protection of cordless communications depends
upon the technology used in each instance. Id. See State v. McVeigh, 224 Conn.
593, 623, 620 A.2d. 133, 148 (1993) (upholding state law prohibiting unlawful
interception of cordless communications). But see Askin v. McNulty, 47 F.3d
100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1995) (commenting legislature proper forum for evaluating
new technology and its impact on privacy rights).
15 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing
expectation of
privacy for radio portion of cordless communications).
56 See Nunez, supra note 17, at 484 (observing state of cellular
communications prior to Federal Communications Commission allotting fixed
ranges of frequencies).
" See Lapidus, supra note 4, at 39 (characterizing frequencies used in
cellular communications). Unlike cordless phones, cellular phones may not be
intercepted by readily available consumer products. See Hricik, supra note 46, at
109. Cellular telephone calls "are rarely intercepted or conflated with the calls
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communication is within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1), prohibiting unauthorized interception or use while providing for all
privileges.58 Intentionally intercepted cellular or cordless communications may not be introduced into evidence regardless if a claim of
privilege is available.59 Federal and state prohibitions against the intentional interception of cellular communications has not made such
interceptions technologically more difficult. 6° In consideration of the
1994 Amendments to the federal statute and advances in cellular
technology, cellular communications provide a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to sustain
the attorney-client privilege and
6
Fourth Amendment protection. 1
C. Direct Computer Communications and PrivateNetworks
The expectation of privacy in direct computer to computer and
private network computer communications rivals that of landline
telephone calls. 62 The fact communications in the form of digital
"bits and bytes rather than by [human] voice" are transmitted via
land-based telephone lines should not affect the attorney-client
privilege's availability. 63 Consequently, all constitutional and
statutory protections, prohibitions, and privileges available to landof others." Jarvis, supra note 36, at 476. But cf. Hricik, supra note 46, at 104
(asserting overhearing another cellular telephone conversation not uncommon
when using cellular phone).
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994) (protecting cellular communications from
intentional interception).
'9Jarvis, supra note 36, at 477.
60See id. at 477 (opining criminal and civil prohibitions against intentional
interceptions have not made interceptions more challenging). Cellular pirates
and scanners purchased prior to 1993 may intercept cellular communications,
although such a practice is illegal. See Hricik, supra note 46, at 108 (indicating
scanners used to intercept cellular communications are illegal to sell in United

States).
See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 476 (asserting cellular calls have same
protections as landline calls).
6'See id. at 478 (indicating direct communications occurring by computer
over land-based lines has same protections as traditional telephone calls).
63 Id. at 478; see also Hricik, supra note 46, at 110.
61
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line communications are applicable to private network computer
communications. 4
Facsimile transmissions (" faxes") are considered direct computer to computer communications, sending digital signals over traditional land-based telephone lines.65 Faxes are subject to Fourth
Amendment protections and the attorney-client privilege. 66 Despite
possible misdirection or interception of a fax transmission, a reasonable expectation of privacy is still afforded this medium.67 Misdirected fax transmissions may be at risk of losing their privilege, but a
fax properly directed is subject to the claim of privilege. 6' Fax
transmissions and other direct computer to computer communications over land-based lines maintain their privileged character if
properly directed. 69
There are generally two forms of private network computer
communications. First, commercial on-line services such as Amer64

See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (providing analysis and

discussion of landline telephone communications).
615 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 110 (characterizing faxes as electronic,
computer-to-computer digital communication).
"
See United States Fidelity and Trust Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 44142, 460 S.E.2d 677, 687-88 (1995) (holding fax communication as privileged);
see also Jarvis, supra note 36, at 478 (stating no one doubts faxes subject to
attorney-client privilege); Hricik, supra note 46, at 110 (finding faxes subject to
attorney-client privilege).
61 Suppose a fax is properly directed and
received by a fax machine in an
attorney's office. The fax sent may contain information of a privileged nature.
The fax sits in the tray of the machine for hours, subject to the eyes of anyone
working in the office, housekeeping crews, and a steady influx of clients.
Although the fax, in this particular situation, may not be private, courts tend to
find a properly directed fax maintains its privilege. Note, however, that ethic
opinions have addressed a lawyer's duty upon receiving a misdirected fax. See 6
PROF. LAW. 26, 26 (1994) (quoting ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Opinion 94-382).
61 See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 478 (commenting
facsimile transmission are
privileged electronic communications).
6
See generally Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (holding fax
transmissions protected under attorney-client privilege).
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ica Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy provide users with e-mail access that is insulated from the Internet. ° While many on-line services provide gateways to the Internet,7' e-mail communications
within a private network do not require Internet access.72 Second,
internally accessed private networks allow e-mail computer communications that are often closed to external landlines. 73 Internally accessed private networks are commonly found in corporations or law
firms and allow attorneys to communicate with clients or other attorneys within the network.74
Electronic communications via private computer networks constitute wire communications within the meaning of the federal statute.75 Courts have held communications over private networks are

70

See Karen L. Casser, Employers, Employees, E-Mail and the Internet, in

THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES, at
4 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed. 1996) (explaining commercial on-line services do not
access Internet except when directing e-mail outside network). "[A]n e-mail
message sent from the user with a CompuServe account to a user with an
America Online account will travel over the Internet, but the users may not even
be aware the Internet is involved." Id. at 4 n.9.
7 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997)
(characterizing America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy as online services
with gateways to Internet).
" See Skupsky, supra note 2, at 49 (explaining sender posts e-mail message
on private service and recipient receives it on same service). The posted e-mail
message is recorded only on the host e-mail file server. See id. (noting no copies
recorded on sender or recipient desktop).
13 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 110 (defining
closed, private network).
Private network communications, such as a corporate internal e-mail system,
occur entirely over land-based telephone lines, often without access to external
land-based telephone lines.
See id. (discussing closed, private networks
commonly used in corporations and law firms).
14 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (observing
private networks do
not require gateways to Internet).
"' See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994) (stating private computer
networks within meaning of federal statute).
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subject to the attorney-client privilege.76 In United States v. Maxwell,7 the Military Court of Appeals held that an expectation of privacy exists in e-mail transmissions sent via America Online service."
The Maxwell court found interception of e-mail by a hacker does not
diminish one's expectation of privacy. 9 America Online is considered a large semi-public host acting as a gateway to the Internet and
Internet e-mail.80 The Maxwell decision should be narrowly construed as applying the attorney-client privilege to e-mail on private

76 See,

e.g., National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp.,

No. 93-2528-G, 1994 WL 878920, at *3 (finding e-mail communications sent
between in-house counsel and corporate client protected by attorney-client
privilege); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 44142, 460 S.E.2d 677, 687-89 (1995) (holding e-mail and fax transmissions
privileged in corporate setting); United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F.
Supp. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding inadvertent disclosure of e-mail
destroys attorney-client privilege).
" 45 M.J. 406 (U.S.A.F. 1996).
78 See id. at 420 (finding Fourth Amendment protects transmitters
of e-mail).
Expectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in large part on the type
of e-mail involved and the intended recipient. Id. at 419. Messages sent to the
public at large in the "chat room" or e-mail that is "forwarded" from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy. Id. The court
recognized the difference between a network e-mail communication such as
America Online and a direct computer "real time" communication. Id. The
America Online communication is stored in a centralized computer until the
recipient opens the network and retrieves the mail whereas a direct
communications are lost forever unless it is downloaded to disk. Maxwell, 45
M.J. at 418. America Online, however, offered contractual privacy protection
that provided employees would not read or disclose subscribers' e-mail to anyone
except authorized users. See id. at 417 (stating expectation of privacy depends
upon type of e-mail and America Online e-mail provides such expectations).
'9 See id. at 418.
go See supra note 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing Reno and
America Online). America Online allows users to communicate with other
America Online subscribers on its own internal e-mail network. Maxwell, 45
M.J. at 410. "It is also possible to access other computer users outside the
America Online computer subscription service...." Id.
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computer networks.8 Other federal and state courts have declined to
extend e-mail protections under the Fourth Amendment based on a
perceived lack of confidentiality and privacy.82
IV. INTERNET E-MAIL
A.

E-mail Communication

Electronic mail ("e-mail") is an electronic medium, allowing
computer users to communicate via digital signals with other user's
internal or external to an organization's network of computers.83 Email occurs immediately, sending a message referred to as "mail"
from the sender to the recipient's mailbox. s Senders and recipients
have mailboxes with distinguishing characteristics, which facilitate
proper delivery of the mail.85 E-mail, as distinguished from traditional landline, cellular, and cordless calls, is an inconsonant form of
communication, requiring senders and recipients to read and compose messages individually at different points in time.16 E-mail of-

" But cf. supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing attorney-client
privilege and Fourth Amendment protections applied to direct computer
communications).
" See Matthews, supra note 15, at 292 (asserting both state and federal
statutes afford no reasonable expectation of privacy to e-mail).
" See Olmsted, supra note 2, at 523 (explaining fundamental function of email). E-mail is one of the fastest growing branches of digital technology. id. It
is estimated 40 million e-mail users will be sending some 60 billion messages by
the year 2000. See John M. McKelway et. al., Law in Cyberspace: To the
Internet and Beyond 1, MASS. LAW. WKLY. 11 (April 1996).
84 See Matthews, supra note 15, at 274 (noting e-mail arrives within
minutes
of being sent).
85 See id. (stating users have unique e-mail addresses
to send and receive
messages).
86 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2335
(1997)
(observing e-mail messages sent are stored waiting for recipient to check
mailbox).
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fers a mode of communication on a worldwide basis that is cost effective, convenient, and efficient."
B.

InternetE-mail and Security Risks

The Internet originated out of an experimental project conducted
by the Department of Defense in 1969.88 "The Internet enables tens
of millions of people to communicate and access vast amounts of
information from around the world." 8 9 Serving as a premiere global
network, the Internet is an aggregation of networks forming a single
network. 90 The Internet is accessible through several different
sources, generally through hosts themselves, or through entities with
host affiliation.9 ' Hosts serve as the gateway to the Internet.9 '

See Robert L. Jones, Client Confidentiality: A Lawyer's Duties with
Regard to Internet E-Mail (visited July 12, 1998) <http://wwwcomputerbar.org
/netethics/bjones.htm> (discussing advantages of electronic communications
versus paper-based communication). "Electronic messages move at the speed of
light while paper moves at the speed of the United States Postal Service." Id.
Electronic messages save space, money, and are more rapidly amd accurately
accessible than paper documents. See id. (maintaining cost of electronic
messages is only fraction of cost of paper-based communication).
8' See Hricik, supra note 46, at 112. The Internet is the product of a military
program called ARPNET (Advanced Research Project Agency Network), created
to make possible computers operated by the "military, defense contractors, and
universities defense-related research" to communicate by redundant channels
even if portions of the network are damaged by war. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
"The Internet, originally intended as a fail-safe communications network in time
of nuclear disaster, was designed more with ease of networked communications
in mind than messaging security." Merrill, supra note 1, at 14.
17

89 Id.

9o See Matthews, supra note 15, at 276 (characterizing Internet as single
giant world-wide network). The Internet is decentralized in nature, creating a
worldwide network that is owned by no one. See id. at 277 (referring to Internet
as "no man's land"). An estimated 200 million people are expected to have used
the Internet by 1999. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334 (finding 40 million people
used Internet by March 1997).
9' See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334 (describing how an individual gains Internet
access). Major online services, such as America Online, CompuServe, the
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The Internet serves as the foundation upon which the global email network operates. 93 Unlike e-mail sent in a direct computer
communication, Internet e-mail travels from the sender's computer
through a land-based line to several intermediate computers, called
hosts and routers that are owned by third parties, before reaching the
recipient's mailbox.94 Routers aid the sender's and receiver's hosts
in distributing Internet e-mail. 9 E-mail messages, therefore, often
pass through several intermediate computers owned and operated by
miscellaneous public and private entities before actually reaching the
recipient's mailbox. 96 The consequence of hosts and routers is generally fast and efficient computer communication. However, legitimate privacy concerns exist in the legal community because hosts
and routers that receive e-mail messages create opportunities for interception, misdirection and disclosure.97

Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to the Internet as semi-public hosts.
See id. at 2334 (estimating 12 million individual subscribers to commercial
online services in 1997). Phone lines and exchanges throughout the world
connect the Internet. Lapidus, supra note 4, at 39.
92 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 112 (observing
there are several million host
computers). Each host computer has a unique Internet address for sending and
receiving e-mail to the subscribers of that host. Id.
93 See Matthews, supra note 15, at 276 (observing
Internet is world's largest
computer network).
94 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 112.
(commenting e-mail sent in direct
computer communication goes directly from sender's computer to password
protected mailbox of recipient).
9' See id. (discussing how Internet e-mail travels from senders host, to
router, then to recipient's host). Routing e-mail through the Internet is
accomplished by directing e-mail on the most direct course from the sender to the
receiver, effectively avoiding any problems that may arise. See Matthews, supra
note 15, at 278 (stating routers find closest routers to direct their e-mail).
96 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 114 (noting Internet e-mail
messages may go
through a dozen or more intermediate computers); Lapidus, supra note 4, at 39
(explaining Internet e-mail may pass over dozens of intermediate computers
owned by disparate public and private entities).
9' Internet e-mail messages are susceptible to interception when stored in
intermediate computers. See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 479-80 (tracing path of
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When an Internet user sends someone e-mail, the original e-mail
is not sent to the hosts or routers. 98 "A copy of the original e-mail is
sent and the original is stored on the user's computer." 99 In fact,
"every time the e-mail passes through a host or router, another copy
is made."'00 The host or router, who may lawfully use or disclose
the e-mail sent through the system "to the extent necessary to render
the service or protect its rights," may intercept the copies. '01 Any
employee of the router or host can monitor e-mail transmissions that
are otherwise confidential.' 2
E-mail communications are vulnerable to various other security
risks that jeopardize privacy on the Internet.' 3 Hackers utilize pro-

travel of Internet e-mail through host computers via land-based telephone lines).
Internet e-mail, however, is generally transmitted piecemeal via hosts and
routers, decreasing the likelihood of misuse. See Hricik, supra note 46, at 115
(observing Internet e-mail sent in packets rather than whole messages).
98See Olmsted, supra note 2, at 524 (illustrating how e-mail messages
created and stored).
99Id.
'o Id. E-mail may exist long after one party deletes the message because it is
only removed from their computer system, and then only when the computer
needs the available space. See Charles A. Lovell, Danger'sof E-mail Underline
Need for Policies, MASS. LAW. WKLY. B4 (April 1996) (describing e-mail user's
perception of e-mail as ephemeral); see also Charles A. Lovell & Roger W.
Holmes, The Dangers of E-mail: The Need for Electronic Data Retention
Policies, R.I. B.J. 7, 7 (Dec. 1995) (describing plaintiffs' attorneys as "smoking
gun" evidence that is discoverable resulting from e-mail communications).
Deletion of e-mail is a formidable task because of storage and copies of messages
that are routinely saved. See Aaron Grossman, Is Opposing Counsel Reading
Your E-mail?, MASS. LAW. WKLY. B4 (Nov. 1996) (stating e-mail may be harder
to get rid of than nuclear waste because of intermediate computers back-up
system).
10' Hricik, supra note 46, at 114.
102 See id. (stating Internet e-mail is subject to review by host and router
employees as part of ordinary monitoring or maintenance).
'03On-line networks use firewalls, specialized gateway computers that
insulate the inside network from the outside world, but hackers are still able to
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grams called "sniffers" to search for key words in unencrypted '°4 email as it travels through hosts and routers.' 5 Hackers also use another type of program called "spoofing."'06 Spoofers configure an
intermediate computer to resemble the recipient host, effectively intercepting the e-mail message.'0 7 While interception of e-mail by
sniffers or spoofing is a felony, sniffing and spoofing are still very
real risks to confidentiality and privacy.'08
V. ANALYSIS: INTERNET E-MAIL AND THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege may not currently protect Internet
e-mail communications because the medium is commonly perceived
to lack privacy.' 9 Commentators and ethics advisory committees

corrupt the network. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing sophisticated
security precautions that are susceptible to hackers).
'0 Encryption is electronic "lock and key" technology.
Id. Encryption
"scrambles a message so that.. .the messages are unreadable to anyone except the
intended recipient of the message." Lapidus, supra note 4, at 40.
10' See Grossman, supra note 100, at B4 (explaining sniffers search for
sender's or recipient's address, then store information on hacker's computer).
Sniffers access information that is received by hosts and routers. See Hricik,
supra note 46, at 115 (stating sniffers capture information on intermediate
computers using software to detect unencrypted e-mail messages).
'06 See Grossman, supra note 100, at B4 (observing that spoofers intercept email messages and can alter or destroy message).
'07See Hricik, supra note 46, at 115 (explaining spoofer intercepts recipients
e-mail sending message back to sender stating message received). Unlike
sniffers, the intended recipient never receives the spoofed message. Id.
,o8Title 18 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part: "Anyone
who intentionally obtains an 'electronic communication' while stored in an
'electronic storage system' or an 'electronic communication service' commits a
crime." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994). Section 2702 provides: "any person who
provides an 'electronic communication service' who discloses the content of an
'electronic communication' stored in or carried on that service commits a
crime." 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (a) (1994).
'09 See J.T. Westermeier et. al., Ethical Issues on the Internet and World
Wide Web, COMPUTER LAW. 8, 11 (Mar. 1997) (indicating concern over
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have reached disparate conclusions when addressing the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege to Internet e-mail." ° Civil and criminal cases have dealt with the application of the privilege in e-mail
communications sent through private and closed computer networks."' Courts have yet to address the application of the attorneyclient privilege to Internet e-mail communications."' Internet e-mail
communications are commonly perceived to be more susceptible to
interception than privileged communication mediums such as landline telephone, cellular telephone, direct computer to computer and
private computer networks." 3 Potential interception by hackers or
employee monitoring is the principal reason for doubting the exten-

insufficient security in Internet e-mail may fail to protect privilege); Jarvis, supra
note 36, at 479 (stating privilege unclear for Internet e-mail communications
because of greater interception risk).
"' "Contemporary ethics committees and commentators opine that because
federal law now makes it a crime to intercept.. .e-mail, the interception of such
should not result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege." Lapidus, supra
note 4, at 40. Other commentators believe the answer to the privilege issue is
dependent on whether the disclosure is intentional or inadvertent. See id.
(explaining inadvertent disclosures do not destroy privilege). But see Iowa
Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 96-1 (May
16, 1996) (requiring encryption for e-mail message to avoid ethical violation);
South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee, Ethics Advisory Op. 94-27, 11 LAw.
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 67 (1995) (finding ethical violation committed by attorney
unless electronic communication guaranteed confidentiality in e-mail
communication); North Carolina State Bar, Published Op. 215 (1995)
(concluding precautions required when utilizing e-mail to protect client
confidentiality).
..See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (finding in National
Employment and Maxwell that private network computers afforded attorneyclient privilege).
"2 See Lapidus, supra note 4, at 39 (observing no cases could be located for
the article that discussed whether unauthorized interception of e-mail constitutes
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege). For the purposes of this note, no cases
could be located that discussed the application of the attorney-client privilege to
Internet e-mail.
13 See supra notes 34-108 and accompanying text (discussing various modes
of communication, privacy concerns and attorney-client privilege).
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sion of the attorney-client privilege to Internet e-mail." 4
Intentional interception of Internet e-mail is a crime." 5 The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act protects privacy interests in
Internet e-mail. ' 6 Direct computer to computer communication is
within the meaning of "electronic communication" under federal
statute.'7 Routers and hosts utilized during an Internet e-mail transmissions are protected pursuant 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2701, and
2702."18 Internet e-mail communications intercepted in violation of

See Matthews, supra note 15, at 285 (stating focus of doubts surrounding
Internet e-mail and privilege center around perceived lack of confidentiality).
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994) (stating intentional interception of Internet
"4

e-mail from intermediate computer is a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994)
(stating provider of electronic communication service that discloses
communication commits a felony).
116 See Matthews, supra note
15, at 288 (asserting statutory framework of
federal statutes supports objective expectation of privacy with e-mail).
"' Title 18 of the United States Code provides: "'electronic communication'
means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign

commerce...." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
..Section 2510 provides in pertinent part:
(14) "electronic communication system" means any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.
(15) "electronic communication service" means any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994). Section 2510(17) "electronic storage" provides:
"(a)ny temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of any
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of that communication..." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994).
Section
2701(a) provides:
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federal law, similar to landline telephone, cellular telephone, direct
computer to computer and private computer network communications, are inadmissible evidence in a legal proceeding." 9 In addition,
otherwise privileged communications intercepted in violation of federal law does not lose its privileged character.'20 The federal statutory prohibition against interception of Internet e-mail communications justifies a reasonable expectation of privacy when using this

Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization access that facility, and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
702(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b)(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service
to the public while its in electronic storage in such system shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and (2) a person or
entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service- (A) on behalf
of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created
by means of computer processing of communications received by
means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of
such service; and (B) solely for the purpose of providing computer
storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of such
communications for purposes of providing any services
other than storage or computer processing.

U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
"9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994) (stating wire or oral communications that are
intercepted are inadmissible in trial, hearing, or any other proceeding).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994) (providing intercepted electronic
communications maintain attorney-client privilege).
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If a court determines a user justifiably relied on the privacy of a
communication medium, the attorney-client privilege attaches.'
Courts have held that landline telephone, direct computer to computer and private computer network communications warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy and are subject to the attorney-client
privilege. 23 Communications sent by these mediums are subject to
.
Internet e-mail cominterception, misdirection and
munications have comparable security risks.' These security risks
communishould not deter a court from finding that Internet 2e-mail
6
cations warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy.

2'

See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable

expectation of privacy justified for landline communication because of federal
statutory protection).
122 See United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329 (holding communication
protected if made under circumstances where reasonable expectation of privacy);
Nunez, supra note 17, at 490-91 (opining expectation of privacy necessary for
attorney-client privilege to exist).
123 See Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding Fourth
Amendment protects landline telephone communications); United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (U.S.A.F. 1996) (holding private computer network
communications privileged); United States Fidelity and Trust Co. v. Canady, 194
W. Va. 431, 441-42, 460 S.E.2d 677, 687-88 (1995) (holding fax communication
as privileged); National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., No.
93-2528-G, 1994 WL 878920 at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994) (finding
direct computer to computer e-mail privileged).
124 See supra notes 34-82 and accompanying text (observing
security risks in
landline, direct computer and private network communications).
1' See supra notes 83-108 and accompanying text (discussing Internet e-mail
and privacy risks).
126 See infra note 127 (opining Internet e-mail does not present greater
security risk than communication mediums that are privileged).
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Internet e-mail communications do not pose a greater risk of interception than other privileged communication mediums.'27 Landline telephone communications may be intercepted by illegal wiretaps.2' Cellular communications are at risk of interception through
the use of specially adapted scanners. 2 9 Private computer network
and Internet e-mail communications are vulnerable to illegal interception by hackers. 3° In each instance, interception is a felony but
nonetheless a very real risk. 3'
Internet e-mail and landline telephone communications are susceptible to employee monitoring.'
Employees of entities owning
hosts and routers may legally subject Internet e-mail to monitoring
within the normal scope of business.'33 Switchboard operators for
landline telephone communications may legally monitor phone conversations if acting within the usual course of business. 3 4 Employees in both situations may monitor communications and disclose

,27 See supra notes 34-108 and accompanying text (discussing inherent
security risks in communication mediums afforded attorney-client privilege and
Internet e-mail communications ambiguous status).
28 See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973) (considering
improper electronic surveillance of landline telephone calls and attorney-client
privilege).
29 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining cellular
communications are not susceptible to inadvertent interception).
3o See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (U.S.A.F. 1996) (finding
interception of e-mail by hacker does not diminish privacy expectation); supra
notes 105-110 (discussing Internet e-mail and hackers).
.3,See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994) (stating intentional interception of
electronic message stored in electronic storage system is a felony); 18 U.S.C. §
2702(a) (1994) (stating disclosure of electronic communication stored in or
carried on a service commits a crime).
,32 See Hricik, supra note 46, at 114 (observing privilege landline telephone
communications subject to switchboard operators eavesdropping).
,' See Jarvis, supra note 36, at 480 (explaining employees may lawfully
review both Internet e-mails and landline telephone communications).
134

Id.
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their contents to third parties.' 35 Landline telephone communications
36
are clearly afforded the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Employee monitoring conducted in the normal scope of business
should not diminish the reasonable expectation of privacy necessary
to sustain the application of the attorney-client privilege to Internet
'
e-mail communications. 37
The extension of the attorney-client privilege to various communication mediums exemplifies the legal systems ability to adapt
rules of law to advances in technology. In 1888, the Supreme Court
of the United States recognized the attorney-client privilege to protect communications between a lawyer and client. 3 8 During the
twentieth century, society experienced a communications boom that
revolutionized the way lawyers and clients communicate.' 39 In consideration of new communication mediums, the legislature provided
statutory prohibitions against interception and the courts expanded
the application of the attorney-client privilege.' ° The legislature, in
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, made interception of
Internet e-mail a crime."" This statutory prohibition against interception warrants a reasonable expectation of privacy when using
,3See Hricik, supra note 46, at 114 (finding landline telephone calls subject
to monitoring pursuant federal statute). 18 U.S.C. § 2511 provides that both
Internet e-mail and landline telephone communications are subject to monitoring
and such monitoring does not prevent a reasonable expectation of privacy for
landline communications. See id. at 115 (citing no case has held monitoring
destroys landline telephone communication privilege).
,36
See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (finding attorney-client
privilege applicable to landline telephone communications).
"' See Hricik, supra note 46, at 114 (suggesting distinction between Internet
e-mail and landline telephone communications is routers); see also supra notes
98-102 and accompanying text (discussing routers and hosts).
' See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (holding attorney-client
privilege is that of clients).
139 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
communication
advances and the Internet).
'40 See supra notes 34-82 and accompanying text (observing communication
mediums protected under attorney-client privilege).
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1994).
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Internet e-mail.' 42 In addition to statutory protection, Internet e-mail
is a reasonably safe mode of communication because messages are
not commonly intercepted. 143 A court addressing the application of
the attorney-client privilege to Internet e-mail would be justified in
holding that such communications are privileged.

142

See Lapidus, supra note 4, at 40 (observing modem ethics committees and

commentators believe that because federal law make interception of Internet email a felony, interception should not result in waiver of privilege). Because
employee monitoring of Internet e-mail is the same as monitoring of landline
telephone calls, and Internet e-mail is protected by federal statute, "there is no
reasonable argument against privilege unless the presence of an eavesdropper is
known or expected." Jarvis, supra note 36, at 480.
,41 See id. (noting author's personal experience indicates majority of Internet
e-mails not intercepted). Attorneys' Peter R. Jarvis and Bradley F. Tellam, in a
discussion concerning the attorney-client privilege, state:
[Olne might ask whether, as a matter of fact, the risk of interception
via the Internet is empirically greater than the risk of a break-in to a
private law office located in a high crime area or the risk that a lawyer
will be mugged and robbed of his briefcase while waiting for a bus at
night. If privilege is not destroyed by such risks (and it is not), it
should not be destroyed by similar risks in the electronic form.
Id.; see also Hricik, supra note 46, at 114 (opining no greater security risk when
Internet communication travels over phone lines than traditional phone calls);
Lapidus, supra note 4, at 42 (stating the risk of interception of Internet e-mail is
relatively low). Because Internet e-mail is generally transmitted in pieces rather
that as an entire message, even if an interception occurs the communication may
be unreadable. See supra note 100 (discussing transmission of e-mail in packets).
But see Matthews, supra note 15, at 287-88 (asserting Internet e-mail not
protected until reasonable expectation of privacy is reality); Gruber, supra note 6,
at 655 (believing unprotected confidential e-mail sent via Internet should
eliminate privilege status of communication).
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VI. CONCLUSION: FUTURE OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
"Unless you can modify a rule to deal with the realities of modern
technology, you will have a rule that cannot be enforced."'44
A communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege
provided the mode of communication utilized warrants a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The courts have traditionally extended the
application of the attorney-client privilege to a communication medium once it is deemed sufficiently private. Modern communication
mediums protected by the attorney-client privilege do not offer an
absolute guarantee that interception or inadvertent disclosures will
not occur. An absolute guarantee is not necessary for the application
of the attorney-client privilege.
Many legal commentators opine that communications sent by
way of Internet e-mail are particularly vulnerable to interception.
For this reason, communications sent by Internet e-mail may waive
the client's attorney-client privilege. It is indisputable that Internet
e-mail is susceptible to interception, misdirection and monitoring.
Communication mediums that are currently protected by the attorney-client privilege, however, are susceptible to the same risks. The
interception of Internet e-mail requires a degree of sophistication and
expertise from hackers. In short, Internet e-mail is not easily intercepted. The intentional interception of Internet e-mail, regardless of
the degree of sophistication required, is a felony. Internet e-mail
communications are not absolutely secure. Internet e-mail, nonetheless, offers a reasonably private mode of communication that warrants the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
As the speed of business increases, clients will demand lawyers
to keep pace. Internet e-mail offers lawyers and clients a cost effective and time efficient mode of communication. A historical consideration of the attorney-client privilege illustrates its flexibility and
ability to adapt to technological advances in communication. While
the attorney-client privilege may not currently extend to Internet e-

'
Cohen, supra note 49, at 1 (quoting Massachusetts lawyer Mark I.
Berson's opinion of modem communications and attorney-client privilege).
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mail communications, technology and necessity will demand its
protection in the future.
Sean M. O'Brien

